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Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc.: Standing to Sue
Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933;
Reflections on Gustafson·
I. INTRODUCTION

As a result of the stock market crash in October 1929, the face and
structure of the stock market began a radical transition period. 1 The total
value of the stock market plunged from a high of $89 billion in October
1929 to $15 billion in 1932. 2 In 1933, Congress responded by passing the
Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act") and a year later the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act")? However, enacting a law is
only the beginning. Determining how to apply the law is usually much
more difficult.
4
One such problem escalated with Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. The
United States Supreme Court held in Gustafson that in order to have
standing to sue under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, one must have
purchased stock in an initial public offering. 5 Since that ruling, there
have been conflicting opinions as to whether the same restriction applies
to claims falling under section 11 of the same Act. 6 While many district
courts have decided this issue, only one circuit has addressed it - the
Ninth Circuit in Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, lnc. 7 In Hertzberg, the
court held that Gustafson was not applicable to a section 11 claim. 8 Thus,
an investor need not have purchased stock in an initial public offering to
*

Copyright © 2000 by James E. Shapiro.
I. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURlTIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 3. 5 (2d ed.

1997).
2. See id. at 5.
3. See id.
4. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
5. See id. at 576, 584.
6. Compare Gould v. Harris, 929 F. Supp. 353, 359 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding Gustafson
applies to section II claims), and Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361, 1375-76 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(holding Gustafwn applies to section II claims), with In re Websecure, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D.
364, 367-68 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding Gustafson does not apply to section II claims), Schwartz v.
Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 178 F.R.D. 545, 554-57 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding Gustafson does not
apply to section II claims), and Adair v. Bristol Tech. Sys., Inc., 179 F.R.D. 126, 131-32 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (holding Gustafwn does not apply to section II claims).
7. 191 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 1999).
8. See id. at I 082.
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have standing to sue under section 11. This case note analyzes the
Hertzberg holding and discusses the different arguments used by district
courts that came to the opposite conclusion. The case note ultimately
concludes that Hertzberg is correct.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to appreciate the Hertzberg decision, a basic understanding
of Gustafson is required. Additionally, an understanding of the
similarities and differences between section 11 and section 12 of the
1933 Act is necessary.
A. The Gustafson Decision

A basic understanding of Gustafson is required in order to determine
if its decision applies equally to section 11 and section 12 claims. In
1989, Gustafson, McLean, and Butler (collectively "Gustafson"), the sole
shareholders of Alloyd, Inc., decided to sell their company .9 Wind Point
Partners II, L. P. ("Wind Point") and others agreed to purchase all issued
and outstanding stock through a holding company, Alloyd Holdings, Inc.
10
("Alloyd Holdings"). After the sale, Alloyd Holdings' earnings were
significantly lower than the earning estimates relied upon during
11
negotiations. Unhappy with their purchase, Alloyd Holdings and Wind
Point sued Gustafson claiming that "the statements made by Gustafson
and his coshareholders regarding the financial data of their company
were inaccurate, rendering untrue the representations and warranties
12
contained in the contract." They further argued that "the contract of
sale was a 'prospectus,' so that any misstatements contained in the
agreement gave rise to liability under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act." 13
The case eventually made its way up to the United States Supreme Court
which ruled, inter alia, that section 12 was limited to initial public
14
:l'
•
. d thelf
. c Iatm.
. 15
of1enngs
an d deme
9. See Gustafwn, 513 U.S. at 564.
10. See id. at 564-65.
II. See id.
12. /d. at 565-66.
13. /d. at 566.
14. "Initial public offering" as used in this case note means "public offerings by issuers and
their controlling shareholders." See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 576. There are two categories of
offerings, and within each category, two types. The two categories of offerings are public and
private. Public offerings are offerings made to the public at large. These types of offerings are highly
regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Private offerings are offerings made to a
specific group of investors. In the majority of cases, as long as companies follow specific rules, no
filings to the SEC are required. Within each category of offerings there are two types, initial and
secondary. Initial offerings are offerings that come directly from the issuing company or a
controlling shareholder. Any other transfer of a security after the initial offering is a secondary
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In makings its decision, the Supreme Court noted that, in general, the
1933 Act deals only with public offerings. Yet Congress specifically
made an exception for section 17. The Supreme Court held that because
Congress had specifically made an exception for section 17, but did not
specify an exception for section 12, section 12 is bound by the general
rule and is limited to initial public offerings. 16
In deciding Gustafson, the Court did not address the issue of whether
one had to have purchased securities in the initial public offering in order
to have standing to sue under section 11 of the 1933 Act. 17 Rather, the
Supreme Court was dealing with section 12(2). Yet, because of their
comparison between the legislative history of the two sections and some
comments made in the two dissenting opinions, district courts are split on
whether the same limitation applies to section 11 claims. 18
B. Sections 11 and 12

With a basic understanding of the Gustafson decision, a comparison
of section 11 and section 12 is helpful. The Supreme Court has noted that
"[i]n the wake of the 1929 stock market crash and in response to reports
of widespread abuses in the securities industry, the 73d Congress enacted
two landmark pieces of securities legislation: the Securities Act of 1933
(1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)." 19
Wisely, the authors of the two acts decided not to focus on how to handle
fraud after discovering it, but rather on how to prevent fraud from
occurring. Thus, the main focus of the Acts is disclosure of information.
However, without penalties, no law is effective. Thus, the two acts
provide penalties for those who fail to follow their stringent
requirements. Section 11 20 and section 1221 are express remedies made
available by the 1933 Act.
offering. Thus, an initial public offering is one that is made to the public at large and is made by the
company or its controlling shareholders.
15. See id. at 566, 576, 584.
16. The Supreme Court said:
[T]he legislative history ... showed that Congress decided upon a deliberate departure
from the general scheme of the Act in this one instance, and "made abundantly clear" its
intent that § 17(a) have broad coverage. No comparable legislative history even hints that
§ 12(2) was intended to be a freestanding provision effecting expansion of the coverage
of the entire statute. The intent of Congress and the design of the statute require that §
12(2) liability be limited to public offerings.
ld. at 577-78 (citations omitted).
17. See id. at 566.
18. See cases cited supra note 6.
19. Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1994).
20. Section II of the 1933 Act provides in part that:
(a) In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective,
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
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There are three major differences between section 11 and section 12.
The first, and seemingly most obvious, is the infraction each was
intended to cure. 22 Section 11 deals with untrue statements or omissions
of material fact found in the registration statement, 23 while section 12
deals with untrue statements or omissions of material fact found in a
"prospectus." 24 While on its face this is a major difference, the Gustafson
decision minimized this difference by altering the definition of
"prospectus." 25
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading,
any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition
he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in equity, in any court of
competent jurisdiction, sue ....
(e) The suit authorized under subsection (a) may be to recover such damages as shall
represent the difference between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price
at which the security was offered to the public) and (I) the value thereof as of the time
such suit was brought, or (2) the price at which such security shall have been disposed of
in the market before suit, or (3) the price at which such security shall have been disposed
of after suit but before judgment if such damages shall be less than the damages
representing the difference between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the
price at which the security was offered to the public) and the value thereof as of the time
such suit was brought.
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994 & Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
21. Section 12 of the 1933 Act in part provides that:
(a) Any person who(2) offers or sells a security ... which includes an untrue statement of material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading ... shall be liable subject to
subsection (b), to the person purchasing such security from him ....
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
22. See infra note 24.
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 771. It is important to note that, at least prior to the Gustafwn decision,
there are two different types of prospectuses under the Act, an "informal" prospectus and a "formal"
prospectus. An "informal" prospectus is defined as any communication, written or oral, which offers
any security for sale. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2)(10) (1994 & Supp. 1998). A "formal" prospectus has
specific content requirements found in the Act, see id. § 77j, and is used during the usual process of
a public offering. See id. § 77e (1994 & Supp. 1998). Section 5(b) forbids the disclosure of any
information, even if it is not an offer, without a valid registration statement unless the information
conforms to the requirements of a "formal" prospectus. See 15 U.S.C § 77e(b). Because the process
of obtaining a valid registration statement is a long process, companies issue communications in the
form of "formal" prospectuses prior to a valid registration statement to disseminate information
about the upcoming offering. However, if the communication does not meet the requirements of a
"formal" prospectus, it is considered an "informal" prospectus and the company has violated the
1933 Act.
25. See supra note 24. An "informal" prospectus can arise during either a private or public
offering while a "formal" prospectus can only arise in a public offering. Because an "informal"
prospectus can arise during a private offering, the scope of section 12 (pre-Gustafson) was wide
enough to include a cause of action under a private offering. In contrast, the only time a registration
statement is required is during a public offering which limits the scope of section II to public
offerings. When the Gustafson decision took away the "informal" prospectus it limited section 12
claims to "formal" prospectuses and in doing so, limited the scope of section 12 to public offerings.
Thus, Gustafson took away a major difference between section II and section 12.
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The second major difference between section 11 and section 12 lies
in the different requirements for updating the information covered by the
respective sections. For a registration statement, the information
enclosed, and only that information, must be kept accurate after the
registration statement effective date.Z6 Thus, as long as the registration
statement is accurate as of the effective date, only the information
contained in the registration must be kept current. The same is not true
for section 12. Anytime a prospectus is issued, it must accurately reflect
the condition of the company at the time the prospectus is issued. 27 It is
important to note that a prospectus must meet the requirements of section
10, 28 which requires the same information as the registration statement. 29
Thus, if after the effective date, the registration statement does not
contain "a material fact necessary in order to make the statement, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading," 30 the issuer must update the registration statement through
the prospectus to avoid liability under § 12(a)(2). 31 The distinction is a
subtle one but nonetheless important. If the issuer leaves a fact out of its
registration statement and prospectus that was not necessary at the time,
but later becomes necessary, the issuer does not have a duty to add it to
the registration statement but does have such a duty with respect to the
prospectus.
The last major difference between section 11 and section 12 is that
different individuals can be held liable for violations of the respective
sections. Section 11 lists all of the potential defendants-a very
expansive list. 32 Under section 12, the only person who can be sued is the
person who actually offered to sell or sold the security. 33 The potential
defendants list is much broader under section 11 than section 12.
With a basic understanding of sections 11 and 12 and with a
knowledge of Gustafson, a discussion of Hertzberg. 34 can be undertaken.
Prior to Hertzberg, no circuit court had addressed whether the scope of
section 11 was limited by the Gustafson opinion. 35

26. See Cox ET AL .• supra note I, at 312. The effective date is the date on which the SEC
gives its OK to proceed.
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
28. See Gustafwn. 513 U.S. 561.
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2).
31. See Cox ET AL., supra note I, at 310.
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(l )-(5) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 771.
34. 191 F. 3d I 076 (9th Cir. 1999).
35. The Eighth Circuit had an opportunity, but refused to do so. See Parnes v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 122 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 1997).
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FACTS

Dignity Partners, Inc. ("Dignity") approached individuals with
terminal illnesses, the majority of which had contracted AIDS, and
purchased their life insurance policies. This gave the terminally ill
customers much needed cash to live more comfortably the remainder of
their shortened lives. 36 At first the business endeavor was successful, but
Dignity soon encountered a problem they had not anticipated. A major
source of Dignity's business was comprised of people with AIDS. With
the discovery of drugs that prolonged the lives of individuals suffering
from AIDS, Dignity was no longer able to adequately predict their
customers' life expectancies. 37 In order for Dignity's business to be
profitable, Dignity had to be able to predict, with a certain degree of
accuracy, how long the customers were going to live. 38 With customers
living longer, Dignity had to wait longer than originally anticipated to
collect on their customers' outstanding policies. 39 This caused both
immediate and long-term cash problems. 40
Prior to common knowledge of the widespread use of these life
prolonging drugs, Dignity went public. 41 Shortly after, however, public
awareness heightened, causing Dignity's stock to plummet. 42 Once stock
prices dropped, Howard Hertzberg and two other investors ("Hertzberg")
filed a class action lawsuit claiming, among other things, that Dignity
knew of the new drugs on the market and knew of the effect it would
have on the company before it went public but intentionally left that
information out of the registration statement in violation of section 11 of
the 1933 Act. 43
Dignity filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because Hertzberg
had not purchased the securities in the initial public offering, the suit was
barred under Gustafson. 44 The district court, ruling from the bench,
granted the motion. Hertzberg appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 45

36. See Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1078; Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Brief at 4-5, Hertzberg,
191 F.3d at 1076 (No. 98-16394).
37. See Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1078; Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Brief at 4-5, Hertzberg
(No. 98-16394).
38. See Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, Hertzberg (No. 98-16394).
39. See Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1078; Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Brief at 5-6, Hertzberg
(No. 98-16394).
40. See Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Hertzberg (No. 98-16394).
41. See Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1077.
42. See id. at 1077-78.
43. See id.; Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Brief at 12, Hertzberg (No. 98-16394 ).
44. See Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1078.
45. See id.
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IV REASONING
o

In deciding the case, the Ninth Circuit first looked to the plain
meaning of section 11. 46 The relevant portion of section 11 states that
47
"any person acquiring such security" may sueo Looking first to
Webster's Dictionary, the court focused on the word "any" and
concluded that it meant "ALL" persons acquiring such security, subject
only to the limitation that they purchase "such securityo" 48 The court
further held that this limitation only requires that the purchaser trace its
49
security back to the initial offering encompassing the false statement.
The court then focused on the damages provisions of the section,
which states that "[t]he suit
may be to recover such damages as shall
represent the difference between the amount paid for the security (not
exceeding the price at which the security was offered to the public)" and
the price at the time of trial. 50 Based on the fact that Congress put in a
provision that provided for a price other than the initial offering price,
the court reasoned that Congress's intention was for this to apply to
secondary transferso 51 The court concluded by quoting Gustafson, "We
52
will 'avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant. "'
Finally, the court rejected Dignity's argument that the restriction set
forth in Gustafson applied to section 11 claims based on the fact that the
Court in Gustafson was not dealing with a section 11 claimo 53 The court
went further by stating that "the [Supreme] Court gave no indication that
it intended this restriction to apply to section 11."54 The Hertzberg court
further noted that since the decision was issued, no circuit court had
changed its analysis of section II claims, and that only three district
courts had disallowed standing to sue under section 11 at that timeo 55
0

0

0

46. See id. at I 079-80.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
48. See Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1080 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1986)).
49. See id. (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)).
50. !d. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e)). The statute actually defines three alternative points to
measure the price difference; however, for the purposes of this discussion, the price at the time of
trial is sufficient.
51. See id.
52. !d. (quoting Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 574).
53. See id.
54. !d.
55. See id. at I 081. The Ninth Circuit listed two district courts in addition to the district court
that it reversed. See id. (listing Gould, 929 F. Supp. at 353, and Gannon v. Continental Ins. Co., 920
F. Supp. 566 (D.N.J. 1996)). Prior to Hertzberg, the only circuit court that had the opportunity to
look at the issue refused to do so. See Parnes, 122 F.3d at 539.
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The Hertzberg decision was simply a reiteration of the Ninth
Circuit's traditional way of interpreting a section 11 claim. But is it the
correct view, particularly in light of Gustafson?
V. ANALYSIS
Prior to Gustafson, courts were split on the scope of section 11.
Many courts followed the more expansive interpretation found in the
Second Circuit's decision, Barnes v. Osofsky, 56 which limited standing to
sue to those investors who could "trace" their securities to a defective
registration statement. 57 The "trace" principle not only allows standing to
investors who purchased their securities during an initial public offering,
but also gives standing to investors who purchased their securities on the
secondary market and can trace their securities back to a defective
registration statement in an initial public offering. Notwithstanding the
Barnes decision, other courts limited section 11 's scope to only those
investors who purchased their securities in an initial public offering with
a defective registration statement, denying any investor who purchased in
the secondary market. 58
Even after the Gustafson opinion, courts remain split on the scope of
section 11. Each side continued to use the same basic arguments as
before. These arguments rely upon the legislative history of the 1933
Act, comments found in the majority opinions of both Gustafson and
Naftalin, comments found in the dissenting opinions of the Gustafson
opinion, and the statutory text of section 11. Each of these arguments are
discussed below.

A. The Legislative History of the 1933 Act
The Legislative History of the 1933 Act is by far the biggest weapon
used by those who have eliminated or simply never adhered to the
"trace" principle set forth in Barnes and supposedly eliminated by
Gustafson. 59 Yet both sides claim the legislative history supports their
proposition.
56. 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967).
57. See PPM Am. v. Marriott Corp., 820 F. Supp. 970 (D. Md. 1993); In re Crazy Eddie Sec.
Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197 (E.D.N.Y. I 992); In re E1scint, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 374 (D. Mass.
1987); Abbey v. Computer Memories, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Cal. I 986); Gibb v. Delta
Drilling Co., 104 F.R.D. 59 (N.D. Tex. 1984); In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130
(D.N.J. 1984); Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Minn. 1984); Turner v. First Wis.
Mortgage Trust, 454 F. Supp. 899 (E. D. Wis. I 978).
58. See Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682,691 (3d Cir. 1991); In re
Delmarva Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1293, 1309 (D. Del. 1992); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 602, 607 n.1 (S.D. Ill. 1978).
59. Of the nine cases that interpreted Gustafwm as eliminating the "trace" rule examined in
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Those who would limit section 11 's scope to initial offerings point to
the Gustafson opinion where the Court noted that sections 11 and 12
have similar legislative history. 60 They argue that because both sections
came from the same legislative history, the analysis under Gustafson
should be applied the same way for section 11 as it was for section 12. 61
This reasoning has two problems. First, section 11 and section 12 apply
to two distinctly different situations. Second, if these courts were to read
further in the legislative history, they would discover that the same
legislative history they quote cuts out an exception to the general rule for
claims under section 11.
Sections 11 and 12 not only differ in requirements to file suit but also
in those who may be sued. While it is true that they do have many
similarities (particularly after Gustafson), to claim that because they have
the same legislative history they should be treated the same is one more
step toward abrogating the need for two separate sections. If this trend is
followed, sections 11 and 12 will soon be indistinguishable.
The majority of those who claim Gustafson reversed the "trace"
principle62 look to the legislative history dealing with the 1933 Act in
general, which states, "The bill affects only new offerings of
securities .... It does not affect the ordinary redistribution of securities
unless such redistribution takes on the characteristics of a new
offering." 63 The proponents of the "trace" principle correctly
acknowledge that the legislative history indicates that the 1933 Act deals
generally with initial offerings of securities. 64 However, they point out
that the same House Report later states "that § 11 remedies are available
'regardless of whether [plaintiffs] bought their securities at the time of
the original offer or at some later date. "' 65 To stop short of this important
this note, none of them supported their decision with any other reasoning other than the Legislative
History and the Gustafson opinion, nor refuted the other issues outlined. See Broscious v. Children's
Place Retail Storess, No. 97-5021JCL, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12986 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 1999); In re
Summit Med. Sys., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (D. Minn. 1998); Warden v. Crown Am. Realty Trust, No.
96-251,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16194 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1998); In re WRT Energy Sec. Litig., 96
Civ. 3610, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14009 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1997); Zeid v. Open Envtl. Corp., NO.
96-12466-EFH,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23469 (D. Mass. Dec. 16, 1997); Gannon. 920 F. Supp. at
566; Gould, 929 F. Supp. at 359; Murphy v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., No. 95-1926MA,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22207 (D. Or. May 9, 1996); Stack, 903 F. Supp. 1361.
60. See Gustafwn, 513 U.S. at 580-81.
61. See Stack, 903 F. Supp. at 1375; Gould, 929 F. Supp. at 358; In re WRT Enerxy Sec.
LitiJ:., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 14009 at* 18-* 19; In re Summit Med. Sys., 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
62. See In re Summit Med. Sys., 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (quoting Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 58081); In re WRT Enerxy Sec. LitiJ:., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14009 at *18-19; Gould, 929 F. Supp. at
358; Stack, 903 F. Supp. at 1375.
63. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 5 (1933).
64. See Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 132.
65. !d. at 132 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 22 (1933)); Schwartz, 178 F.R.D. at 566
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 22 (1933)); Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., No. 96-12272-DPW,
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passage would give the impression that the legislative history supports
eliminating the "trace" principle. A thorough reading of the legislative
history makes it clear that Congress created more than one exception to
the general rule that the 1933 Act is limited to initial offerings, one of
those exceptions being the expansion of who may sue under section 11.66
B. The Gustafson and N aftalin Opinions

Another argument commonly used by those who have eliminated the
"trace" principle is found in both the majority and dissenting opinions of
Gustafson. 67 The court in Brosious 68 set forth this argument, when
discussing the scope of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act:
The Court in Gustafson noted that an earlier decision, United States v.
Naftalin, interpreted "the one provision of the Act that extends
coverage beyond the regulation of public offerings, § 17(a) of the 1933
Act." This language implies that section 11 only regulates public
offerings. The Court explained that "the legislative history relied upon
in Naftalin showed that Congress decided upon a deliberate departure
from the general scheme of the Act in this one instance and 'made
abundantly clear' its intent that § 17(a) have broad coverage. See
[Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 778] (quoting legislative history stating that
'"fraud or deception in the sale of securities may be prosecuted
regardless of whether ... or not it is of the class of securities exempted
69
under sections 11 or 12, "')

The argument states that, because the Court categorized sections 11
and 12 as limited when demonstrating the broad scope of section 17(a),
sections 11 and 12 must be similarly limited in scope.
This argument, however, is misguided. A closer reading of United
States v. Naftalin 70 is revealing. The full text of the Naftalin opinion
dealing with this topic is as follows:
Although it is true that the 1933 Act was primarily concerned with the
regulation of new offerings, respondent's argument fails because the
antifraud prohibition of § 17 (a) was meant as a major departure from
that limitation. Unlike much of the rest of the Act, it was intended to
cover any fraudulent scheme in an offer or sale of securities, whether in
the course of an initial distribution or in the course of ordinary market
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22126, at *20 (D. Mass. May 27, 1998) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 22
(1933)).
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1994).
67. See In re Summit Med. Sys., 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; In re WRT Enerxy Sec. Litif?., 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14009 at *20-*21.
68. No. 97-5021JCL, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12986, at *14.
69. !d. (citations omitted, emphasis added).
70. 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
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trading. This is made abundantly clear both by the statutory language,
which makes no distinctions between the two kinds of transactions, and
by the Senate Report, which stated:
"The act subjects the sale of old or outstanding securities to the
same criminal penalties and injunctive authority for fraud,
deception, or misrepresentation as in the case of new issues put out
after the approval of the act. In other words, fraud or deception in
the sale of securities may be prosecuted regardless of whether the
security is old or new, or whether or not it is of the class of
securities exempted under sections 11 or 12."
Accord, H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1933). Respondent
is undoubtedly correct that [the 1933 and 1934 Acts] prohibit some of
the same conduct. But "[the] fact that there may well be some overlap
ts. nett. her unusua l nor un1...ortunate. ,71

In response to this passage, three points are worth making. First, the
Naftalin Court recognized that although section I7(a) was "a major
departure" from the primary concern of the 1933 Act, it was not the only
departure. 72 Second, an interpretation that the scope of section II is
greater than section 12(a), but less than section 17(a), is consistent with
the Naftalin decision. And finally, the Gustafson and subsequent
decisions that quote the Senate Report used in Naftalin fail to quote the
entire relevant text.
1. Section 17(a)
The Naftalin Court recognized that although section 17(a) was "a
major departure" from the primary concern of the I933 Act, it was not
the only departure. 73 The Court's statement "[u]nlike much of the rest of
74
the Act" indicates that there are other exceptions. If section 17(a) was
the only exception, the Court would have left out the words "much of,"
making the statement "unlike the rest of the Act." Furthermore, the Court
later recognizes that there is some overlap between the I933 Act and the
1934 Act. 75 Because the main focus of the 1934 Act deals with old
securities, or securities sold after the initial offering, the only reason they
would mention the overlap is to demonstrate that there are exceptions in
the 1933 Act that deal with old (or secondary) securities.

71. Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 777-78 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. /d. (emphasis added).
75. See id.
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The Court in Gustafson, while attempting to prove that Congress
intended section 12(a) to be limited only to those who purchased directly
from the initial offering, noted that Congress cut out an exception to the
general rule for section 17.76 Quoting Naftalin, the Court noted that this
was "a major departure from the limitation [of the 1933 Act to new
offerings]." 77 The Court reasoned that because Congress did not make it
clear that section 12(a) (and section 11, so the argument goes) is an
exception to the general rule (the general rule being that the 1933 Act
deals only with initial offerings), these sections are limited to initial
offerings. 78 However, if the Gustafson Court had been specifically
addressing section 11, it certainly would have noted that Congress did
79
make it clear that section 11 has an exception from the general rule.
Yet, because this exception only applies to section 11 and not to section
12(a), it is logical that this was not mentioned by the Court.
Furthermore, the legislative history did not state that section 17 was
the only section to deviate from the primary purpose of the Act. 80
Because such a statement is lacking, it can easily be concluded that
Congress intended other exceptions. This notion finds great support in
the previously cited legislative history. It also finds support in the fact
that as far back as 1951, circuit courts were allowing a private cause of
action for security holders who purchased securities in a secondary
offering under section 11. 81 Congress has had plenty of time to amend
and make clear its intent. If that intent is different from that which the
courts have articulating, then Congress would certainly have made that
known by now.
2. The Naftalin decision

An interpretation that the scope of section 11 is greater than section
12(a), but less than section 17(a), is consistent with the Naftalin decision.
The Gustafson court held that because, as stated in the Naftalin decision,
the legislative history specifically stated that section 17 was broad as
opposed to sections 11 and 12, section 12 must be limited. 82 While this
may be true, 83 the same limitation does not necessarily apply with the

76. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 577-78.
77. /d. at 577 (quoting Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 777-78).
78. See id. The court in Brosious used this line of reasoning to argue that Gustafwn
eliminated the "trace" rule. See Brosious, No. 97-5021JCL, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12986, at *14.
79. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 22 (1933).
80. SeeS. REP. No. 73-85, at 5 (1933).
81. See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
82. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 577-78.
83. For our purposes, it is true because the Supreme Court said so.
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same degree to section I1. As long as sections II and 12 are more
limited than section I7, the statement remains true.
Section 12(a) is limited to securities purchased in an initial public
offering, while section 11 is limited to securities purchased or traced to
an initial public offering. Yet, both sections 11 and 12 are more limiting
than section 17(a). Section 17(a) encompasses "an offer or sale of
securities, whether in the course of an initial distribution or in the course
of ordinary market trading." 84 Section 17(a)'s scope encompasses all
securities transactions; this is broader than the scope of section 11, which
only covers transactions that either took place during an initial offering
or are traceable to such an offering. Section 12's scope, in turn, is the
least expansive of the three; it includes only those transactions that occur
during an initial public offering.
3. The Legislative History

The Gustafson and subsequent decisions that quote the Senate Report
used in Naftalin fail to quote the entire relevant text. 85 The Naftalin Court
was not trying to insinuate that sections 11 and 12 are identical. Rather, it
was illustrating the broad scope of section 17(a). This is illustrated by
looking at the entire Naftalin quote, a portion of which is often omitted. 86
"In other words, fraud or deception in the sale of securities may be
prosecuted regardless of whether the security is old or new, or whether
or not it is of the class of securities exempted under sections I I or I 2." 87
If we read the legislative history in such a way that "will avoid a reading
which renders some words altogether redundant," 88 it is clear that
Naftalin does not purport to similarly limit sections 11 and I2. According
to Gustafson, section 12(a) is limited to new securities, defining an old
security as any security not sold during an initial offering. Thus, if the
Court in Naftalin was placing the scope of sections 11 and 12 in the same
category, then the phrase "old or new" and "the class of securities
exempted under sections 11 or 12" would mean the same thing.
However, if we read the statement in a way that avoids conflict, then it is
clear that the scope of sections 11 and 12 are different.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 778 (emphasis added).
See Gustafwn, 513 U.S. at 577-78; Brosious, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12986 at *14.
See id.
Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 778 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
Gustafwn, 513 U.S. at 574.
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C. The Gustafson Dissenting Opinions

Another argument raised by the proponents of eliminating the "trace"
principle is found in the two Gustafson dissenting opinions. In her
dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated with regard to sections 11 and 12, "There
is no dispute that the latter two provisions apply only to public offerings
- or, to be precise, to transactions subject to registration." 89 In Justice
Thomas's dissent, he stated, "Nor did Congress limit section 12(2) to
issuers, as it chose to do with other provisions that are limited to initial
distributions. See section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(2)." 90
The courts in both In re Summit Medical Systems, Inc. and In re WRT
Energy take these portions of the opinion as an affirmation that the
"trace" principle has been effectively overruled. 91
A closer look at the two dissenting statements reveals that they are
consistent with the "trace" principle when taken in the context in which
they were made. As District Judge Robert W. Sweet noted in Adair v.
Bristol Technology Systems, Inc., in context, Justice Ginsberg's
"statement is intended to support Ginsberg's view that section 12(2), in
contrast with section 11, is not limited to public offerings, but rather
includes within its sweep the private securities transaction at issue." 92
Judge Sweet's argument is particularly enlightening when considering
that the main issue in Gustafson was "whether [the] right of rescission
extends to a private, secondary transaction.'m Section 11 is limited to
public offerings (whether initial or secondary is irrelevant for this
analysis). In referencing section 11, Justice Ginsberg was simply
contrasting the scope of section 11 (limited to public offerings) with
what she felt the scope of section 12 should be (encompassing both
public and private offerings). The statement should not be read to mean
that section 11 's scope does not include the "trace" principle.
Addressing Justice Thomas's dissent, Judge Sweet further noted:
In his textual analysis of§ 12(2), Justice Thomas contends that § 11 's
text limiting liability to "every person who was a director of ... or
partner in the issuer" at the time of filing indicates that its scope is
limited to initial public offerings, whereas the absence of such language
in § 12(2) is persuasive that private transactions not involving an issuer
are included. There is no dispute here, however, that § 11 liability
extends beyond its specifically enumerated potential defendants, or that
89. /d. at 600.
90. /d. at 590.
91. See In re Summit Med. Sys., 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; In re WRT Energy Sec. Litig., 96
Civ. 3610, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14009, at *20-21.
92. Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 132.
93. Gustafwn, 513 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added).
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liability is limited to public offerings. Therefore, as with Justice
Ginsberg's proposition, this statement is consistent with retention of the
94
tracing requirement for standing to sue under§ 11.

As Judge Sweet suggests, Justice Thomas was using the description
of potential defendants to show that section 11 is limited to initial public
offerings and then contrasting that to the broad scope of section 12(2).
Nowhere in Justice Thomas's dissent does he suggest that those who can
trace their security to a defective registration statement issued in an
initial public offering do not have standing to sue. Furthermore, the fact
that both sections 11 and 12 are limited to initial public offerings is
consistent with the "trace" principle. Only those investors who can trace
their security back to the initial offering have standing to sue. While
Justice Thomas's statement may not actively support the "trace"
principle, it certainly can be read to be consistent with it.
The courts that eliminated the "trace" principle seem to think that the
legislative history combined with the Gustafson opinion are persuasive
enough to ignore all other arguments raised, for they fail to address
95
them.

D. The Statutory Text of Section 11
When trying to decide the meaning of a statute courts look to the
96
statute itself. Several portions of the statute show that Congress
intended section 11 to apply to transactions other than the initial public
offering. First, the statute gives a cause of action to "any person
acquiring such security." 97 Second, the statute specifically contemplates
the price of the securities to be different from the initial offering price at
the time the suit is commenced. 98 Third, the statute has a higher standard
for plaintiffs if an earnings statement has been on the market for a period
of twelve months prior to the effective date of the registration
statement. 99

94. Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 132.
95. Although the court opinions cited do not address the following arguments, in the
memorandum prepared by Dignity during the Hertzberg hearing, Dignity articulates the opposing
argument. This opposing argument is incorporated below. See Answering Brief of
Defendant/Appellees, Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1076 (No. 98-16394).
96. "[W]hen interpreting a statute, we look first and foremost to its text." United States v.
Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350,356 (1994).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
98. See id. § 77k(e).
99. See id. § 77k(a).
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1. "Any person acquiring such security"
The statute gives a cause of action to "any person acquiring such
security." 100 The court in Hertzberg, while finding that the "trace"
principle is valid, stated, "The term 'any person' is quite broad, and we
give words their ordinary meaning. According to Webster's Dictionary,
'any' means 'one, no matter what one'; 'ALL'; 'one or more
discriminately from those of a kind. "' 101 Likewise, the court in Schwartz
v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc. held that "under the plain language of § 11,
any purchaser may bring a claim as long as he can prove that the
securities acquired were issued in connection with a false registration
102
statement, i.e., if the shares can be traced to the offering."
Furthermore, the court in In re Fine Host Corp. noted an important
distinction between the texts of section 11 and section 12(2): "Section 12
expressly limits recovery to only those purchasers who purchase their
shares directly from a seller who makes a false or misleading
prospectus .... In contrast, section 11 permits recovery by 'any person
..
. ,,10:l
acqumng
sue h secunty.
While the preceding argument seems strong, none of the courts
focused on the pivotal word in the statute, "any person acquiring such
security." 104 In the Defendants/Appellees' brief, Dignity points out that
nowhere does Congress define the word "such". 105 Dignity then traces
the history of the 1933 Act, pointing to what was happening at the time
and arguing that the term "such security" is meant to limit the scope of
the remedy, making it only available to those who purchased the security
from the initial offering. 106 However, the Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument, holding that "[t]he limitation on 'any person' is that he or she
must have purchased 'such security."' 107
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[ w ]hen
interpreting a statute, we look first and foremost to its text." 108
109
Furthermore, when the text is clear, no further analysis is needed.

I 00. See id. § 77k(e).
101. Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1080 (citations omitted).
102. Schwartz, 178 F.R.D. at 556.
103. In re Fine Host Corp. Sec. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67 (D. Conn. 1998) (citations
omitted). See also Danis v. U.S. Comm., Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 923,931-32 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (emphasis added).
105. See Answering Brief of Defendant/Appellees at II, Hertzberg, 191 F. 3d at 1076 (No. 9816394).
106. See id.
107. Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1080.
108. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. at 356.
109. See Connecticut Nat'! Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). The Court stated:
"We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
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Webster's Dictionary defines "such" as "of the same class, type, or sort;
in the same category; similar." 110 Applying that definition to the text, the
term "such security" means a security that falls within the category set
forth previously in the text, i.e. a security sold under a faulty registration
statement.
Nowhere in the language of section 11 does it state that you must
purchase your securities during the initial offering. Instead, it clearly
states that "any person acquiring such security" 111 may sue. Because the
plain meaning of the text is available, logical, and unambiguous, no court
need look further to determine who has standing to sue.
2. The damages provision

Another portion of the statute that supports the "trace" principle is
found in the damages provision where the statute allows for a price other
than the initial offerings price. The court in Adair reasoned that "[i]f
Congress intended to limit liability to purchasers in the [Initial Public
Offering], the language could simply read 'at the offering price.' Instead,
the language permits recovery for purchases at prices other than the
offering price, as long as the liability is so limited." 112 As the court in
Hertzberg points out, "[s]uch provision would be unnecessary if only a
person who bought in the actual offering could recover, since, by
definition, such a person would have paid 'the price at which the security
was offered to the public."' 113
The Defendants in Adair argued that a price differential could occur
during an Initial Public Offering if that offering were a shelf offering,
and thus, the language in the statute was necessary to account for shelf
registrations. 114 As the Adair court correctly pointed out, this argument
fails because shelf registrations are allowed under Rule 415, which was
promulgated in 1982, almost fifty years after the 1933 Act was passed. 115
In Hertzberg, the Defendants argued that Congress, in providing for
a price different than that of the initial offering, was simply protecting

means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then,
this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete."' /d.
II 0. WEBSTER'S SECOND INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1941 ).
Ill. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
112. Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 133.
113. Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1080.
114. See Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 133-34. A shelf registration is where a company is allowed to
register securities, but must wait for a certain amount of time before offering them to the public.
Thus, under a shelf registration, it would be possible to have a time gap between the effective date of
the registration statement and the time that the company offers the securities to the general public.
115. See Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 133-34.
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investors against "unscrupulous" brokers. 116 However, the Ninth Circuit
rejected this argument because "it makes the unlikely assumption that
Congress chose to prevent victims of broker fraud from recovering the
117
additional amount out of which they were cheated."
Other courts have used the damages provision as support for the
"trace" principle. In so doing, they have held that because of the
appropriation for damages based on the securities price being different
than that of the initial public offering, the drafters intended section 11 to
.
118
app Iy to secondary transactiOns.
3. The heightened burden for plaintiffs starting a year after the effective
date of the registration statement

Statutory support for the "trace" principle is also found in the
heightened burden for plaintiffs starting a year after the effective date of
the registration statement. Section ll(a) provides that a plaintiff must
show reliance on the untrue statement found in the registration statement
if there has been an earning statement on the market that covers a period
119
of at least a year after the registration statement.
Furthermore, the
legislative history on the 1934 amendment, which added the requirement
of reliance where there was a valid earning statement, declared, "The
basis of this provision is that in all likelihood the purchase and price of
the security purchased after publication of such an earning statement will
be predicated upon that statement rather than upon the information
. Iosed upon regtstratwn.
.
. ,12o
d tsc
Schwartz recognized the implications of this section 11 provision
when it stated, "By requiring those who purchase registered stock after
the publication of the twelve-month earning statement to prove reliance,
the statute contemplates relief for those who purchase shares after the
public offering." 121 Congress realized that the price of securities
fluctuates with information received by the market about a certain
company. Without this provision, there could be an investor who only
purchased securities from companies with known faulty registration
statements. By doing this, the investor would always be able to recover
his purchase price from companies whose stock prices dropped, but keep
116. See Hertzberg. 191 F.3d at 1080; Answering Brief of Defendant/Appellees at 11,
Hertzberg (No. 98-16394); The argument is that an unscrupulous broker could actually charge more
for the security than the company had offered it for, thus creating a difference in the price.
117. Hertzberg, 191 F.3dat 1080n.6.
118. See Schwartz, 178 F.R.D. at 556; Cooperman, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22126 at *20.
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
120. Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1082-83 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-1838, at 41 ( 1933)).
121. Schwartz, 178 F.R.D. at 556. See also Cooperman, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22126 at *19*20.
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those stocks whose prices went up. While the example is a bit far
fetched, it illustrates the need for Congress to include the reliance
requirement under section 11.
In Hertzberg, Dignity argued that when the 1933 Act was passed it
was common for a public offering to take more than a year. 122 Because a
public offering could last for more than a year, the "recognition that
Section 11 claims may be based upon purchases more than a year after
the effective date of registration" is no support for the "trace"
principle. 123 Assuming that Dignity is correct, their argument certainly
does not preclude the "trace" principle.
E. Plain Logic and the World We Live In

Putting aside Congress's intent, a look at the remedies from a logical
perspective is worthwhile. Our society has become extremely complex.
The price a particular security sells for is a function of multiple factors,
one of which is the registration statement. No one has argued or can
argue that once a security is sold in a public offering, the registration
statement ceases to be useful. In many situations, the registration
statement must be updated to accurately reflect the company's current
situation. 124 Dignity noted in Hertzberg that
individuals who make aftermarket purchases of stock originally issued
in prior public offerings or in private placements are no less affected by
a false registration statement than those making aftermarket purchases
of stock that was sold in the registered public offering. . . . Such a
distinction simply introduces an element of arbitrariness and
125
unfairness.

Yet, is it really that arbitrary or unfair? Securities purchased prior to
the defective registration statement were priced according to all of the
required correct information. Thus, their original price was "correct", for
lack of a better word. Any trading after that point until the faulty
registration statement would also be "correct." Thus, only those
securities bought or sold immediately after the faulty registration
statement would be affected. For those transactions, the "trace" principle
may seem arbitrary and unfair. Yet, because the majority of the
transactions occurring during a public offering will consist of the
securities being offered, this rule encompasses a majority of the affected
122.
16394).
123.
124.
125.
16394).

See Answering Brief of Defendant/Appellees at 18, Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1076 (No. 98See id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77.
See Answering Brief of Defendant/Appellees at 34, Hertzberg, 191 F. 3d at I 076 (No. 98-
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investors. While the "trace" principle might not be perfect, it is the best
that we have under the statutory language of section 11.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the stock market crashed back in 1929, Congress knew that
changes had to be made. Back then, our society was significantly
different than it is today, yet somehow we trust that Congress's
intentions from the 1930s are still appropriate today. Whether or not this
is true is a moot point now. The Supreme Court has made it clear that
they intend to follow those intentions. The question now becomes, what
exactly did Congress intend for section 11? Many courts, even prior to
Gustafson, felt that Congress intended to limit section 11 to public
offerings, but other courts saw an expansive section 11.
When all of the arguments on both sides are lined up and compared,
no one side is an absolute winner. However, after looking at the evidence
presented by the different courts throughout the country, it seems clear
that the 73rd Congress did not intend section 11 to be limited only to
those investors who purchased their securities in an initial public
offering. The 73rd Congress intended to give standing to sue to those
investors that can trace their securities back to a faulty registration
statement.

James E. Shapiro

